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Abstract. The ability to copy data effortlessly poses significant secu-
rity issues in many applications; It is difficult to safely lend out music
or e-books, virtual credits cannot be transferred between peers without
contacting a central server or co-operation with other network nodes, . . .
Protecting digital copies is hard because of the huge software and hard-
ware trusted computing base applications have to rely on. Protected-
module architectures (PMAs) provide an interesting alternative by re-
lying only on a minimal set of security primitives. Recently it has been
proven that such platforms can provide strong security guarantees. How-
ever, transferring state of protected modules has, to the best of our
knowledge, not yet been studied.
In this paper, we present a protocol to transfer protected modules from
one machine to another state-continuously; From a high level point of
view, only a single instance of the module exists that executes without
interruption when it is transferred from one machine to another. In prac-
tice however an attacker may (i) crash the system at any point in time
(i.e., a crash attack), (ii) present the system with a stale state (i.e., a
rollback attack), or (iii) trick both machines to continue execution of the
module (i.e., a forking attack). We also discuss use cases of such a system
that go well beyond digital rights management.
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1 Introduction
Computer science has transformed the world more rapidly than any technology
before. Online encyclopedia enable worldwide access to knowledge, news travels
faster than ever before and social media provide a global discussion platform.
One key reason for this success is that data can be copied cheaply, easily and
without loss of quality.
Unfortunately this ability also poses a security risk in many use cases. Dig-
ital rights management is the most obvious example: Once released, content
providers cannot prevent that their data is distributed further. But many other
use cases exist as well. We elaborate on valuable applications in Section 2.
Certain types of data should resemble physical objects; It should not be
possible to create exact copies and once transferred to another party, the sender
should no longer have access. This is hard to guarantee in practice. Security
checks can be added to applications and operating systems, but commodity
operating systems are so complex that their correctness cannot be guaranteed.
A determined attacker is likely to find an exploitable vulnerability (e.g, buffer
overflows [13,22]) in this huge trusted computing base (TCB). Alternatively, the
owner itself could have an incentive to break the implemented security features
and launch physical attacks against the machine (e.g., cold boot attacks) [4, 5].
Protected-Module Architectures Recent advances in security architectures pro-
vide the required building blocks for an alternative approach. Protected-module
architectures (PMAs) avoid a huge TCB by only providing a minimal set of
security properties [6, 8, 10–12, 14, 20, 21, 24]. The exact set depends on the ex-
act implementation, but all provide complete isolation of software modules. The
PMA guarantees that modules have full control over their own memory regions;
Any attempt to access memory locations belonging to the protected module at
any privilege level (including from other modules), will be prevented. Protected
modules can only be accessed through the interface that they expose explicitly.
Protected-module architectures can be used to harden security-sensitive parts
of an application. Strackx et al. [20] evaluate a simple use case of a client con-
necting to a protected module. By placing SSL logic inside the protected module,
only SSL packets cross the module’s protection boundaries. Operating system
services are still used to send and receive network packets, but these are not
trusted. As any attempt to access sensitive memory locations in the protected
module will be prevented by the PMA, this effectively reduces the power of a
kernel-level attacker to that of a network-level attacker; Messages can be inter-
cepted, modified, replayed or dropped, but sensitive data cannot be intercepted
by an attacker.
Recently proposed protected-module architectures [6,14] also protect against
sophisticated hardware attacks. Intel SGX, a PMA that is expected to be im-
plemented in Intel processors in the near future, for example, guarantees that
protected modules are only stored unencrypted when they reside in the CPU’s
cache. Before they are evicted to main memory or later to swap disk, they are
confidentiality, integrity and version protected. This prevents many hardware
attacks such as a cold boot attacks [5].
State-Continuity Guarantees Agten et al. [1,2] and Patrignani et al. [16,17] for-
mally proved that protected-module architectures can guarantee strong security
properties of modules while they execute continuously. In practice however ma-
chines crash, need to reboot or lose power at unexpected times. To deal with
such events, modules must store their state on disk. However, confidentiality
and integrity protecting module states before they are passed to the untrusted
operating system for storage, is not sufficient. After the system reboots mod-
ules cannot distinguish between fresh and stale states. In many applications this
forms a security vulnerability.
Parno et al. [15] and Strackx et al. [18, 19] propose a solution and guaran-
tee state-continuous execution; Modules either (eventually) advance with the
provided input or never advance at all.
Our contributions In this paper we build upon these security primitives and
present a protocol to state-continuously transfer state of protected modules from
one machine to another. At a high level, programmer’s point of view, protected
modules execute without interruption while they are transferred between ma-
chines. In practice however, we assume that an attacker may gain kernel- or
hypervisor-level access to the system, but the underlying guarantees provided
by the protected-module architecture cannot be broken. This implies that an
attacker can (i) crash the system at any point in time, (ii) replay network mes-
sages, (iii) impersonate a remote party, and (iv) attempt to roll back the state of
a module (e.g, by creating a new module and replay network packets). Since such
a powerful attacker can easily launch denial-of-service attacks (e.g, by corrupting
the kernel image), such attacks are not considered.
2 Use Cases
When it can be guaranteed that a protected-module instance cannot be rolled
back nor forked when it is transferred to other machines, previously infeasible
use cases become available.
Changing Machine Parno et al. [15] and Strackx et al. [18] proposed an algo-
rithm to guarantee state-continuous execution of protected modules. While this
property enables versatile use cases, it prevents protected modules to be passed
to another machine. In practice however, machines need to be replaced. Our pro-
tocol provides such support. Note that backups do not provide a good use case
as they imply that a module could be restored to a previous state. We explicitly
wish to defend against such behavior.
Multi Processor-Package Systems & Cloud Computing Intel SGX provides strong
security guarantees in face of software and hardware attackers by ensuring that
protected modules are only stored unencrypted in the CPU’s cache. When they
are evicted to untrusted RAM or swap disk, they are confidentiality, integrity
and version protected. Unfortunately, this also prevents protected modules to
be transferred from one processor package to another on the same machine. A
state-continuous enclave must always be executed on the same CPU package
as it was created on. This poses significant practical challenges as applications
can no longer be migrated from one CPU package to another to load balance
execution load.
A similar problem occurs in a cloud computing setting where a virtual ma-
chine may be migrated from one physical server to another. State-continuous
transfer of states can solve such problems.
Digital Wallets Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin continue to gain traction. Bit-
coins can be transferred from one user to another, but network consensus must
be reached before the transfer can be asserted. This has the disadvantage that
bitcoins cannot be transferred when the sender cannot connect to the network.
By relying on security properties of protected-module architectures, an al-
ternative infrastructure can be built easily. Virtual credits can be stored as a
simple counter in a protected module, completely isolated from the rest of the
system. Transferring credits between peers can then be achieved using a state-
continuous transfer of a portion of the available credits. The protocol presented
in section 3 can be trivially modified to enable such use cases (i.e., the sender
no longer sends its current state, nor will it permanently disable itself after the
protocol completed).
Distributed Capability Systems King-Lacroix et al. [7] propose BottleCap a
capability-based mechanism for distributed networks. Resources can be accessed
iff the user has the capability to do so. As access right checks are always local to
the data that is accessed, such a system is much more scalable than traditional
user-based authentication.
By placing capabilities in protected modules and transferring their state con-
tinuously, BottleCap’s difficulties can be overcome; Capabilities can be easily
revoked and special transfer policies for capabilities can be implemented easily.
Lending Digital Content Using the state-continuity properties we provide, digital
content can be lent similar to physical objects; Once content is passed, it can
no longer be accessed by the sender. A book, for example, could be lent out by
state-continuously transferring the protected module it is stored in. When the
user wishes to read a page, it is rendered inside the protected module and only
the resulting image is passed to unprotected code. While significantly raising
the bar for attackers, we acknowledge that this setup does not prevent attackers
from copying the book by copying each rendered page. Additional technologies
such as Intel IPT1 can be used to mitigate such attacks.
3 Transferring State
The protocol that we present only relies on properties (that can be) provided
by almost all protected-module architectures. Therefore, we will not assume any
protected-module architecture in particular when presenting our protocol.
Say we wish to transfer the state of a protected module Msrc from one ma-
chine (i.e., src) to another (i.e., dst). Our protocol operates in two phases. In
the first phase a new instance of module M with a “blank” state module is
created on dst (called Mdst) and a public-private key pair is generated. When
Msrc is guaranteed that the module was deployed correctly, it commits to the
state transfer. This marks the beginning of the second phase where the state is
transferred to Mdst. By encrypting the state with Mdst’s public key, only Mdst
is able to ever resume M’s execution.
1 http://ipt.intel.com/
The Protocol Figure 1 displays the protocol graphically in more detail. In the
first step, Msrc generates a public-private key pair (PKsrc, SKsrc) and passes
PKsrc to dst together with Mblank (the module’s code with a “blank” state)
and a nonce n. Endpoint dst loads Mblank in memory and starts its execution
with PKsrc as argument. This public key will later be used to ensure that only
states signed with the related private key will be accepted. The newly created
module Mdst also generates a public-private key pair (PKdst, SKdst) that will be
used to transfer Msrc’s state securely. The three resulting keys are all stored in
Mdst after which its correct execution is attested
2 to Msrc (step 4). The enclosed
nonce ensures freshness.
After Msrc verified the attestation and found correct, it stops servicing user
requests and uses the PMA’s state-continuity property to commit to the state
transfer; At some point in the future Msrc will transfer it’s state to a module
M with possession of SKdst, or the module will never advance it’s state again.
In step 6 Msrc’s state is encrypted with PKdst and signed with SKsrc. It is
passed together with a new nonce m to dst. After ensuring that the passed
state originated from Msrc, Mdst decrypts the state and resumes the module’s
execution. To avoid that Msrc continues to attempt to transfer state, the pro-
tocols terminates by attesting that Mdst accepted the state transfer. Msrc can
now permanently disable requests to retry state transfer to Mdst and destruct
itself.
(PKsrc,SKsrc) ← gen_keys() Mblank, n, PKsrc start Mblank
(PKdst, SKdst) ← gen_keys()
attestMdst(PKdst || PKsrc || n), PKdst
check attestation
commit state transfer
SignSKsrc+EncPKdst(stateMsrc), m
attestMdst(stateMsrc|| m) 
check signature
accept stateMsrc
check attestatation
finalize state transfer
destroy Msrc
Msrc Mdst
(3)(1) (2)
(4)
(5)
(6) (7)
(8)
(9)
phase 1
phase 2
Fig. 1. Overview of the protocol whereMsrc’s state is transferred continuously toMdst.
Security Analysis Safety of our protocol is based on two simple properties. First,
we rely on the ability to create and store cryptographic keys in protected mod-
ules. At the beginning of phase 2 (i.e., after step 5), Msrc is committed to
2 An attestation is a log of inputs and outputs that is signed by a trusted entity (e.g.,
a PMA platform or TPM chip). In a simple implementation a private key is embed-
ded in the trusted entity that is signed by a trusted third party. This allows easy
verification of the attestation log. Implementations such as Intel SGX [3] however
use more complex cryptographic protocols to prevent linkability of attestation logs.
We do not target a single PMA specifically in this section but simply state what
needs to be attested.
transfer state from Msrc to Mdst. To ensure that only one module instance can
ever resume execution of the module, the state is encrypted using the public key
generated by Mdst. Correct implementation of Mdst guarantees that the decryp-
tion key will never leak. Second, state-continuous execution of Msrc and Mdst
guarantees that neither module will ever be forked.
Loss of power or similar events during the execution of the protocol, may
disrupt execution of the protocol. Such events during the first phase will cancel
the state transfer. Attack events after the state transfer was committed however,
will either (i) eventually result in another attempt to transfer the state to the
same remote module instance (e.g., in case of power or network failure), or (ii)
will lead to a situation where the module will never resume execution (e.g.,
machine dst is physically destroyed).
To ensure that the state originated from Msrc, the protocol passes in step 2
Msrc’s public key to Mdst. This additional security check is not strictly required,
but omitting it leaves the protocol open to a denial-of-service attack from a
remote attacker. As Mdst then would then accept any provided state (and only
accepts a new state once), a remote attacker could send it any state. In that
case Msrc would never be able to complete its state transfer, but it also does not
allow user requests to be handled until the state is transferred.
While guaranteeing that state can be transferred securely, the protocol does
not provide any assurance about the origin of the module’s state. An attacker
masquerading as Msrc could even fabricate a state. In most cases this does not
pose a vulnerability as it only needs to be guaranteed that a specific module
instance will continue to execute continuously while it is transferred from host
to host. For other use cases, a proof of the origin of the module can be easily
added in two ways: (1) Verification of the origin of a module could be built in
the module itself. When the module is initially created, for example, it could
generate a secret shared with a verifier. Even when the module is transferred
from host to host, possession of this secret proves its origin. Or (2) the protocol
could be modified to also attest the correct set up of Msrc to Mdst in step
2. This would prevent the fabrication of states by an attacker, but a verifier
interacting with two module’s over time cannot determine whether they are the
same module instance.
4 Related Work
State-continuous transfer of state is easy when the user can rely on the correct-
ness of the operating system. In practice this assumption is hard to guarantee.
Protected-module architectures provide an interesting alternative, but to the
best of our knowledge, state-continuous transfer has not been addressed in such
a setting.
Related work that relies on a very limited TCB exist, but only provide very
specific security guarantees. Van Dijk et al. [23], for example, present a system
where a central server provide tamper-evident persistent storage. Rollback and
forking attacks of this data is prevented using a trusted time stamping device
executing on an untrusted third party’s server. Our protocol can achieve similar
guarantees (i.e., clients can pass data with build-in protection against rollback
or forking) but is more flexible. Modules for example, can easily choose to only
transfer their state partially, as was discussed in the digital wallet example of
Section 2. We also do not rely on a central server, which provides significant
scalability advantages.
More recently Kotla [9] presented a way to build the digital equivalent of
scratch-off cards. A client can choose to either use a cryptographic key stored
in the TPM chip but cannot hide its use upon an audit. Or it does not access
the cryptographic key and after this choice is proven to a verifier, access is per-
manently revoked. Such scatch-off cards can, for example, be used to download
digital media and later request a refund if it was never accessed. Again, our pro-
tocol supports similar, but more general use cases; Data can be accessed until it
is transferred to another machine.
5 Conclusion
The ability to endlessly copy data poses security challenges in many settings.
We presented a protocol to state-continuously transfer state of protected mod-
ules from one machine to another. We believe that this new security feature of
protected-module architectures enables many use cases that were not possible
before.
References
1. P. Agten, B. Jacobs, and F. Piessens. Sound modular verification of c code exe-
cuting in an unverified context. In Accepted for publication in Proceedings of the
42nd Annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming
Languages (POPL’15), Jan. 2015.
2. P. Agten, R. Strackx, B. Jacobs, and F. Piessens. Secure compilation to modern
processors. In 2012 IEEE 25th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF
2012), pages 171–185, Los Alamitos, CA, USA, 2012. IEEE Computer Society.
3. I. Anati, S. Gueron, S. Johnson, and V. Scarlata. Innovative technology for CPU
based attestation and sealing. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop
on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy, 2013.
4. E. M. Chan, J. C. Carlyle, F. M. David, R. Farivar, and R. H. Campbell. Boot-
Jacker: Compromising computers using forced restarts. In Proceedings of the 15th
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS ’08, pages 555–
564, New York, NY, USA, 2008. ACM.
5. J. Halderman, S. Schoen, N. Heninger, W. Clarkson, W. Paul, J. Calandrino,
A. Feldman, J. Appelbaum, and E. Felten. Lest we remember: Cold boot attacks
on encryption keys. In USENIX Security Symposium, pages 45–60, 2008.
6. Intel Corporation. Software Guard Extensions Programming Reference, 2013.
7. J. King-Lacroix and A. Martin. Bottlecap: A credential manager for capability
systems. In Proceedings of the Seventh ACM Workshop on Scalable Trusted Com-
puting, STC ’12, pages 45–54, New York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM.
8. P. Koeberl, S. Schulz, A.-R. Sadeghi, and V. Varadharajan. Trustlite: a security
architecture for tiny embedded devices. In Proceedings of the Ninth European
Conference on Computer Systems (EuroSys’14), page 10. ACM, 2014.
9. R. Kotla, T. Rodeheffer, I. Roy, P. Stuedi, and B. Wester. Pasture: secure offline
data access using commodity trusted hardware. In Proceedings of the 10th USENIX
conference on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI’12), 2012.
10. J. M. McCune, Y. Li, N. Qu, Z. Zhou, A. Datta, V. Gligor, and A. Perrig. TrustVi-
sor: Efficient TCB reduction and attestation. In Proceedings of the IEEE Sympo-
sium on Security and Privacy (S&P’10), May 2010.
11. J. M. McCune, B. Parno, A. Perrig, M. K. Reiter, and H. Isozaki. Flicker: An exe-
cution infrastructure for TCB minimization. In Proceedings of the ACM European
Conference in Computer Systems (EuroSys), pages 315–328. ACM, Apr. 2008.
12. J. Noorman, P. Agten, W. Daniels, R. Strackx, A. V. Herrewege, C. Huygens,
B. Preneel, I. Verbauwhede, and F. Piessens. Sancus: Low-cost trustworthy ex-
tensible networked devices with a zero-software trusted computing base. In 22nd
USENIX Security Symposium (Usenix’13). USENIX Association, Aug. 2013.
13. A. One. Smashing the stack for fun and profit. Phrack magazine, 7(49), 1996.
14. E. Owusu, J. Guajardo, J. McCune, J. Newsome, A. Perrig, and A. Vasudevan.
OASIS: on achieving a sanctuary for integrity and secrecy on untrusted platforms.
In Conference on Computer & communications security (CCS’13), 2013.
15. B. Parno, J. R. Lorch, J. R. Douceur, J. Mickens, and J. M. McCune. Mem-
oir: Practical state continuity for protected modules. In Proceedings of the IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P’11), May 2011.
16. M. Patrignani, P. Agten, R. Strackx, B. Jacobs, D. Clarke, and F. Piessens. Se-
cure compilation to protected module architectures. In Accepted for publication in
Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS), 2014.
17. M. Patrignani, D. Clarke, and F. Piessens. Secure Compilation of Object-Oriented
Components to Protected Module Architectures. In Proceedings of the 11th Asian
Symposium on Programming Languages and Systems (APLAS’13), 2013.
18. R. Strackx, B. Jacobs, and F. Piessens. ICE: A passive, high-speed, state-continuity
scheme. In Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC’14), 2014.
19. R. Strackx, B. Jacobs, and F. Piessens. ICE: A passive, high-speed, state-continuity
scheme (extended version). CW Reports CW672, KU Leuven, August 2014.
20. R. Strackx and F. Piessens. Fides: Selectively hardening software application com-
ponents against kernel-level or process-level malware. In Computer and Commu-
nications Security (CCS’12), October 2012.
21. R. Strackx, F. Piessens, and B. Preneel. Efficient Isolation of Trusted Subsys-
tems in Embedded Systems. In Security and Privacy in Communication Networks
(SecureComm’10), pages 344–361. Springer, 2010.
22. R. Strackx, Y. Younan, P. Philippaerts, F. Piessens, S. Lachmund, and T. Walter.
Breaking the memory secrecy assumption. In Proceedings of the Second European
Workshop on System Security, pages 1–8. ACM, 2009.
23. M. van Dijk, J. Rhodes, L. F. G. Sarmenta, and S. Devadas. Offline untrusted
storage with immediate detection of forking and replay attacks. In Proceedings of
the 2007 ACM Workshop on Scalable Trusted Computing, STC ’07, 2007.
24. A. Vasudevan, S. Chaki, L. Jia, J. McCune, J. Newsome, and A. Datta. Design,
implementation and verification of an extensible and modular hypervisor frame-
work. In Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP
’13, pages 430–444, Washington, DC, USA, 2013. IEEE Computer Society.
